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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act") grants the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") the power to decide
whether to apply or to forbear from applying certain provisions of the Act to
regulated entities.' Section 10, which outlines the Commission's forbearance
authority, does so in general terms.2 The FCC, being an expert agency, may
choose different modes of analysis to carry out its statutory mandate. This
article explores the Commission's marked shift in the analysis it uses to
evaluate a request by an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") for
Section 10 forbearance from an unbundled network element ("UNE")
obligation. 3

Boston College, Ph.D. in Economics, 1978. Dr. Meisel is a Professor of Economics at
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. He wishes to thank the staff of the journal for
their excellent editorial assistance on this article.
1 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Communications Act of 1934 to add
Section 10, which outlines the criteria the Commission may use to forbear from applying
any of its regulations to telecommunications carriers. Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 401, 110 Stat. 56, 128-29 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 160
(2006)).
2 See id

3 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (outlining the interconnection requirements of
telecommunications carriers). UNE obligations were created to encourage competition in
the telephone market, which is characterized by very high up-front costs to build the
physical facilities of a network. The Act requires incumbent telecommunications carriers
(i.e., telephone companies) to make certain elements of their physical telephone network
facilities available to their competitors. Id. § 251(c). This allows competitors to offer
telephone service at a lower up-front cost, because they do not have to build all of the
necessary infrastructure to reach customers. However, recognizing that competitors could
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Two approaches are at issue: the Omaha ForbearanceOrder of 2005,4 and
the Phoenix ForbearanceOrder of 2010.5 Both decisions arose from petitions
by Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") for forbearance from its interconnection
obligations under Section 251 of the Act. 6 Specifically, Qwest argued that
competition for telecommunications services in the Omaha, Nebraska and
Phoenix, Arizona market areas had increased sufficiently that it should no
longer have to make certain elements of its telephone network available to its
(non-incumbent) competitors. The Omaha approach utilized a comparative
analysis that took into account the state of competition between the incumbent
and competitive carriers, including factors such as the level of retail
competition. The Phoenix approach, which is the FCC's modern approach,
utilizes fewer variables, concentrating on a market power analysis. 9 The FCC
argues that this is consistent with standard antitrust analysis.1o Critics are
skeptical of the FCC's characterization: one questions the rigor of its
analysis," and another believes that it creates a situation in which a grant of
forbearance will be impossible.' 2
eventually become large enough to build their own facilities, Congress gave the FCC the
power to deregulate competitive markets through Section 10 forbearance orders. id. § 160.
But, because Congress did not specifically state when deregulation is appropriate, it is up to
the Commission to decide when markets are competitive enough to warrant deregulation. Id.
As this article will demonstrate, the Commission has experienced growing pains as it
discovers the best way to evaluate forbearance petitions.
4 In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in
the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R.
19,415 (2005) [hereinafter Omaha ForbearanceOrderor Omaha Order].
5 In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in
the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 8622 (2010) [hereinafter Phoenix ForbearanceOrder or Phoenix Order].
6 47 U.S.C. § 251.
Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4, 1; Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note

5, T 1.

17 n.52, 64-72; Phoenix Forbearance
Omaha Forbearance Order, supra note 4,
Order, supra note 5, 21-27.
9 Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 5, 37. A market power approach encompasses
definition of the product and geographic market for each service, actual market shares of the
suppliers of the service, trends in market shares, elasticity of demand for the service, supply
substitutability, and the potential for de novo entry. See id. TT 28, 42.
0
Id. T 1. See also Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of
BroadbandInternet Access: A Policy Frameworkfor Net Neutrality and Open Competitive
Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 135 (2010) (noting that the analytical framework of the
Phoenix ForbearanceOrder would be "well-suited for application in any FCC proceeding
involving competition policy").
1 See Seth L. Cooper, ForbearanceFollies: What the FCC's New Framework Portends
for the "Third Way, " PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS, July 9, 2010, at 1, 2, availableat
http://commcns.org/L8HR9K.
George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Impossible Dream: ForbearanceAfter the
Phoenix Order, PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & EcON. PUB. POL'Y STUD., Dec.

16, 2010, at 1, 1, available at http://commcns.org/KQVys8 ("the standard for forbearance
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Regardless of its characterization, the new approach tends to raise an already
high bar for granting forbearance requests implicating legacy services offered
13
by ILECs over narrowband, circuit-switched facilities. Part 2 discusses the
economic rationales for forbearance, identifies differences between
forbearance and full economic deregulation, and explains the criteria for
forbearance established in the Telecommunications Act. Part 3 provides an
overview of the Commission's forbearance analysis. Part 4 describes the old
approach for evaluating a forbearance request utilized in the Omaha Order.
Part 5 explains the new approach for evaluating a request for forbearance
utilized in the Phoenix Order and compares it to the old Omaha approach.
Finally, Part 6 identifies three refinements that would enhance the rigor of the
Phoenix approach for evaluating forbearance requests.
II. BACKGROUND ON FORBEARANCE AS A REGULATORY
INSTRUMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Overall, the Act's purpose was to promote competition and reduce
regulation in telecommunications markets.14 In order to promote competition,
ILECs are required to "unbundle" elements of the local network to facilitate
the entry of local exchange telecommunications competitors. Later, once
competition has increased in a specific local telecommunications market, the
FCC is authorized by Congress to grant petitions from ILECs for relief from
particular regulatory obligations, if the FCC is convinced that the request
satisfies its criteria.16 Thus, a great deal of discretion belongs to the FCC in the
forbearance decision-making process.
set in the Phoenix Order effectively renders, perhaps inadvertently, Section 10 of the Act
moot by establishing a forbearance threshold-price equals marginal cost-that is
impossible to satisfy in most (if not all) communications markets" (emphasis in original)).
1 Using the old approach, the FCC had granted some form of forbearance relief in only
three of thirteen geographic areas where it had received forbearance petitions. Phoenix
ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 17.
14In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provision of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
1 (2003), vacated and remanded in part, affirmed in
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,020,
part, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 925 (2004) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order]; in re Unbundled Access to Network
Elements; Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
1 (2004), aff'd, Covad
Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533,
Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Triennial Review
Remand Order].
See Triennial Review Order, supra note 14, 1 55 (describing the principles of
unbundling).
1647 U.S.C. § 160.
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Forbearance relief is not an all-or-nothing determination-it may be
narrowly tailored to address the specific market conditions existing in a given
local telecommunications market.17 For instance, the FCC could grant
forbearance to an ILEC for relief from a regulation to unbundle local loops for
mass market residential customers in a specific geographic area within a city
that are used for switched access exchange service. Yet, at the same time, it
could continue to mandate local loop unbundling for other groups of customers
in the same geographic area for the same service. Forbearance relief could be
narrowly targeted to encompass a well-defined market in which effective
competition has emerged.' 8
In contrast, a grant of deregulation without qualification could be overbroad.
It would enable regulatory relief across different telecommunications markets,
including different services (such as switched access exchange services,
broadband Internet access services, special access services), different groups of
customers (such as mass market residential customers, enterprise customers),
and different geographic areas (such as at the level of a wire center,19 in an
entire metropolitan statistical area, or nationwide).20 Forbearance has the
flexibility to be an intermediate step on the path to full deregulation as the
degree of competition deepens and broadens in telecommunications markets in
a metropolitan statistical area.
Two main reasons justify forbearance relief.21 First, the ultimate goal of the
Act is a gradual shift from a highly-regulated market to a fully deregulated
market where consumers are protected by high levels of competition.22 Once a
telecommunications market can sustain effective competition, the Act assumes
that the need for economic regulations disappears. Second, a regulatory
framework and its corresponding regulations involve the use of scarce societal
resources.23 Conceptually, the FCC engages in a cost-benefit analysis to
1 Id. § 160(a) (enabling forbearance from "any regulation or any provision of this Act to
a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications
carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geographic markets"
(emphasis added)).
14-15 (explaining the constituent
See Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 5,
elements of a Commission forbearance determination).
19A wire center is similar to the terms central office and switch. Typically, customers'
local loops terminate at a wire center owned by a telecommunications provider. Compare 47
C.F.R. § 51.5 (2011) (defining wire center), with 47 C.F.R. § 36 app. (2011) (defining
"central office" and "loop").
20
See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
21 For an interesting discussion of similar rationales for regulatory forbearance and the
meaning of regulatory forbearance, see Hudson N. Janisch & Bohdan S. Romaniuk, The
Questfor Regulatory Forbearancein Telecommunications, 17 OTTAWA L. REv. 455 (1985).
22See Triennial Review Order, supra note 14, Tl .
23The Commission reviews its rules every three years in an attempt to ease regulatory
burdens on regulated entities. See 47 U.S.C. § 257 (2006); in re Section 257 Triennial
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evaluate the necessity of continuing with a specific regulation.24 If the costs of
a regulation (including, for example, the impact of a regulation on the
incentive of the ILEC to invest in network upgrades) exceed the benefits (e.g.,
the effect on prices from facilitating intra-modal competition by an unbundling
regulation), the FCC should decide to grant forbearance from the regulation.
The cost-benefit framework the FCC utilizes in its Phoenix Forbearance
Order analyses is qualitative, not quantitative, and appears to supplement the
effective competition analysis. 25
Section 10 instructs the FCC to use three criteria, each of which must be
satisfied to grant forbearance relief:
Notwithstanding section 332(c)(1)(A) of this Act, the Commission shall forbear from
applying any regulation or any provision of this Act to a telecommunications carrier
or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or
telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geographic markets, if the
Commission determines that - (1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not
necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for,
or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service
are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2)
enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of
consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is
consistent with the public interest. 26
Furthermore, in making its public interest determination in 10(a)(3), the FCC is

instructed to evaluate whether forbearance will promote competitive market
conditions, including whether forbearance will enhance competition among
providers of telecommunications services. 27 If forbearance will promote
competition, then forbearance is consistent with the public interest.
111. THE COMMISSION'S FORBEARANCE ANALYSIS
As local competition developed and the time arrived for Section 10
forbearance petitions for relief from unbundling rules, the FCC decision
making process has evolved to its current state-the Phoenix Order
approach-in which unbundling relief is now based on a stricter market power
standard.28 Before, the standards for mandating unbundling relief were broader

Report to Congress Identifying and Eliminating Market Entry Barriers, For Entrepreneurs
and Other Small Businesses, Report, 26 F.C.C.R. 2909 (2011).
24 See, e.g., in re Matter of Standardizing Program Reporting Requirements for Broadcast
Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 26 F.C.C.R. 16,525, TT 44-48 (2011) (discussing the
Commission's intent to conduct a cost/benefit analysis with respect to certain broadcaster
reporting regulations).
25 See discussion, infra Part V.
26 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
27 See id. § 160; Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 14.
28 PhoenixForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, TT 2, 41-45.
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in nature and revolved around a vague "impairment" concept.29 Now, the
standard used to grant forbearance relief from the mandated unbundling has
become much more targeted and structured.3 0 In practice, the standard the FCC
needed to meet to order a network element to be unbundled was lower than the
standard an ILEC must meet, today, to be granted relief from the same
unbundling rule.31
Since the Act, the scope of narrowband circuit-switched unbundling
obligations for ILECs has been hotly contested at the FCC and in the courts.32
Repeated legal challenges to FCC efforts to implement unbundling rules
created an environment of uncertainty for ILECs and competitors alike. Not
until 2005, with implementation of the Triennial Review Remand Order (the
FCC's fourth try since 1996 to implement unbundling rules acceptable to the
reviewing courts), were the narrowband unbundling rules finalized.33
In theory, network unbundling rules and forbearance rules can be
conceptualized as different sides of the same competitive coin. For many
years, the local telecommunications network was viewed as a natural
monopoly. 34 In the Act, in order to facilitate competition for the natural
monopolist, Congress mandated unbundled access to ILEC network elements
in the belief that competition would otherwise be economically infeasible. 35
Network element unbundling rules allow a telecommunications entrant to
begin to construct its own facilities-based network by utilizing critical network
elements controlled by the ILEC for which alternative suppliers were not
available and self-provision was uneconomic. 36 Over time, it was expected that
emerging local competitors would add to their own facilities and become fullblown facilities-based providers of local services.37 When the FCC developed
29 TriennialReview Order,supra note 14, T 84.
30 See discussion, infra Part V.
31See Table 2, infra Part V.
32 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 14, TT 6-19 (recounting the history of the
Commission's unbundling regime).
3 See id. T 7-19.
34 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile
11 (1996)
Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499,
[hereinafter Local Competition Order] ("The incumbent LECs have economies of density,
connectivity, and scale; traditionally, these have been viewed as creating a natural
monopoly.").
See James B. Speta, Antitrust and Local Competition Under the Telecommunications
Act, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 99, 118 (2003) ("the unifying theme of the 1996 Act's local
competition provisions was the presumption that new entrants into local telecommunications
markets would be successful only with the cooperation of the incumbents").
36 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 14, 58 (defining network elements that must
be made available to competitors).
Local Competition Order, supra note 34, T 12 (discussing potential paths of entry into
the local market).
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its unbundling policy, the determination as to what network elements must be
unbundled was not based on a market power analysis. 38 Rather, the objective
of the unbundling policy was to enable competition by mandating unbundled
access to a network element when the entrant would be "impaired" without
access to that network element. 39
IV. THE OMAHA APPROACH
In 2004, Qwest requested relief from narrowband network unbundling
regulations and Title II dominant carrier regulations for the Omaha
metropolitan statistical area ("MSA") based on the assertion that Qwest faced
40
The FCC
intense intermodal competition from a cable company, Cox.
was
Qwest
Specifically,
granted partial relief in response to Qwest's petition.
relieved from its section 251(c) unbundling obligations for nine of its twentyfour wire centers in the Omaha MSA, with respect to its unbundled loops and
dedicated transport. 4 1 Qwest was also relieved from certain dominant carrier
regulations for its entire service area in the Omaha MSA, with respect to mass
-42
market exchange access services and mass market Internet access services.
In its decision, the Commission relied on a generalized analysis. It assumed
the entry of just one facilities-based competitor, 43 recognized a safety net of
regulatory protections (other than interconnection) that would remain in
place,44 and made several optimistic predictions on how local
45
Interestingly, when
telecommunications competition would evolve.
38 For a comparison of the different standards and objectives of the FCC's unbundling
policy and forbearance policy, see DENNIS L. WEISMAN & TIMOTHY J. TARDIFF, PRINCIPLES
OF COMPETITION AND REGULATION FOR THE DESIGN OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 37

(2009), attached to in re Petitions of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Providence and Virginia Beach Metropolitan Statistical Areas; Petitions of Qwest
Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Denver, Minneapolis-St.
Paul, Phoenix, and Seattle Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Reply Comments of Qwest
Corporation, WC Docket Nos. 06-172, 07-97 (filed Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://commcns.org/K7swuQ ("Hence, the standard for mandatory unbundling under §251,
which, at least in theory does not turn on market power considerations, differs from the
standard for forbearance from mandatory unbundling under §10, which by Commission
decree does turn on market power considerations.").
39 See TriennialReview Order,supra note 14, 84.
40 In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in
the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, Petition of Qwest Corp.for ForbearancePursuant
to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), WC Docket No. 04-223, at 1, 8 (filed June 21, 2004).
41Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 59.
42 Id. 15.
43 In other words, Cox. See id. 59; Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 16.
64, 90.
4 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4,
45 Id. % 64-72, 81-83.
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conducting its analysis regarding relief from dominant carrier regulations, the
Omaha ForbearanceOrder used an approach that was more consistent with a
market power analysis.'4
The Omaha approach to evaluate whether to grant relief from unbundling
obligations for network elements had the following components. First, the FCC
analyzed the level of retail competition to the ILEC, using a wire center as the
unit of analysis. 47 Through this variable, the FCC evaluated the competitive
impact of granting unbundling relief on mass market consumers of retail
services.48 Second, the FCC analyzed the level of competition in wholesale
markets for inputs into the production of retail telecommunications services.49
Again, the focus was on assessing the competitive impact of granting
unbundling relief on the purchasers/demanders of critical local network
inputs.50 Third, at the wire center level, the FCC examined the actual and
planned use of competitive last-mile facilities to provide competitive
telecommunications services similar to those offered by the incumbent.5 1
The Commission's general inquiry centered on the impact on competition at
a specific wire center if access to unbundled, rate-regulated elements was no
longer assured.52 If competition were capable of constraining the ILEC from
exercising market power, then relief was granted, albeit accompanied by a set
of competitive safeguards to ensure the continued development of a
competitive market.53
Overall, the FCC cited three key findings to justify its grant of regulatory
relief from unbundling obligations in nine specific wire centers: (1) the very
high level of facilities-based competition, including Cox's use of its own lastmile loops, for telecommunications services from a single cable provider; 54 (2)

Id. T 18, 50 n.129.
47 Id. 50 n.129.
48 Id. The use of a wire center as the unit of analysis makes economic sense for
unbundling obligations for specific loops and transport that are physically related to a
specific wire center. Moreover, competitive conditions appear to vary considerably across
46

wire centers located in the same study area. See TriennialReview Remand Order,supra note

14, 80 ("[i]ndividual routes, even within the same larger geographic area, may have very
different economic characteristics"). It appears that a cable competitor focuses attention,
money, and facilities on only a subset of wire centers to provide traditional
telecommunications services in a metropolitan statistical area.
49 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4,
50 Id.

65.

67-72.
si Id.
68-70 (examining Qwest and Cox's respective coverage in the wire centers
where Qwest requested forbearance).
52Id. 59 (granting Qwest's forbearance petition for certain wire centers, but not others).
53Id. 62 (discussing other provisions of section 251 and 271 on which carriers would
still be able to rely despite the Commission's grant of forbearance relief).
54 Id. T 59.
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the lack of regulatory and operational entry barriers to the market;55 and (3) the
predictive judgment that Qwest would be a stronger competitor if it were
constrained by no more regulation than its competitors (i.e., regulatory
parity).56
With respect to the first finding, the grant of narrowband unbundling relief
57
was dependent on Cox's ability to offer voice service (i.e., "covers" ) for at
least 75 percent of the end-user locations served by a wire center. The FCC
believed that this high level of competitor coverage reflected an economic
commitment, in the form of significant sunk investments, to being a longlasting competitor for Qwest's customers. In contrast, if Cox had been
primarily dependent on access to Qwest's UNEs to provide competition for
retail telecommunications services for end users served by Qwest's wire
center, the case for granting unbundling relief would have been considerably
weaker because Cox would not have been sufficiently independent from, and
60
therefore competitive with, Qwest.
With respect to the third finding, the FCC found that Qwest was the only
significant provider of inputs in the wholesale market.61 Nevertheless, the FCC
made a critical predictive judgment that Cox's presence created natural,
economic incentives for Qwest to offer unbundled network wholesale inputs at
commercially negotiated rates to retail, intramodal competitors in order to
In short, natural, economic
retain utilization of its network facilities.62
incentives to develop wholesale markets replaced the necessity of involuntary,
legal obligations. However, apparently not totally confident of its predictive
judgment, the FCC conditions Qwest's unbundling relief on it still being
subject to section 271 obligations to provide unbundled wholesale narrowband
elements albeit with a more favorable pricing standard for an ILEC.6 The
5 This article does not discuss this second finding because it has little bearing on the shift
from the Omaha Order's generalized analysis based on predictive judgments versus the
Phoenix Order'sstricter analysis.
56Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 78.
s7 "[AJn intermodal competitor 'covers' a location where it uses its own network,
including its own loop facilities, through which it is willing and able, within a commercially
reasonable time, to offer the full range of services that are substitutes for the incumbent
LEC's local service offerings." Id. 60 n. 156.
58Phoenix ForbearanceOrder, supra note 5, 16.
59 Id.
60It should be noted that other forms of intermodal competition (i.e., wireless, Voice over
Internet Protocol) were not considered good substitutes for wireline telephone service given
the lack of data supporting such a conclusion. See Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4,

172.
61

Id.

67.

62 See id.

63Id.

8 1.

90. The section 271 pricing standard, very general and thus subject to varying
interpretations, requires that prices for unbundled elements are just, reasonable, and non-
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FCC stated:
We note that in granting Qwest forbearance from its obligation to provide unbundled
access to loops and transport pursuant to section 251(c)(3), consistent with the
language of the Act, we determined that the application of section 251(c)(3) with its
TELRIC pricing standard was not necessary in certain wire centers to ensure that the
standards of section 10(a) are satisfied. We did not determine that Qwest's provision
of wholesale access to loops and transport was no longer necessary to ensure that the
standards of section 10(a) are satisfied.64
It appears that the distinction reflected a general dissatisfaction with the
measured improvements in competition in narrowband markets resulting from
the previous regulatory scheme. A key part of the unbundling scheme was
utilization of a pricing methodology (i.e., TELRIC or forward looking
incremental cost) that the FCC itself created in implementing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.65 The FCC acknowledged the importance of
preserving access to narrowband unbundled network elements as a competitive
safeguard for local competition, but at a pricing standard that does not
allegedly discourage competitors from constructing their own narrowband
facilities.
In addition, Qwest remained subject to other section 251(c) obligations,
including interconnection, good faith negotiation, and, important to spur retail
competition, resale arrangements, with its mandated retail minus avoided cost
pricing standard.67 Thus, the only significant unbundling relief granted in the
presence of a facilities-based intermodal competitor was with respect to the
pricing standard that an ILEC used when required to offer unbundled
narrowband loops and transport to competitors.68 In the FCC's view,
safeguards continued to preserve the options for fledgling intramodal
competitors to enter local exchange markets by leasing narrowband elements
and/or reselling the incumbent's retail service as first steps to becoming
facilities-based competitors. Over the long run, its economic analysis reflects
not just a hope, but an expectation, that the market structure of local
telecommunications markets will transition from a monopoly to a duopoly, and
eventually to a fully competitive market.
To summarize, there were three key reasons for why forbearance from UNE
obligations was granted using the Omaha approach in nine wire centers: (1) the
presence of a single facilities-based competitor,69 (2) remaining regulatory

discriminatory. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii).
See Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4,
65 Local

105 (emphasis in original).

Competition Order,supra note 34, 672-703.
See Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 105 (emphasis in original).
67 Id. 57.
68 Id.
57.
69 Id.
59.
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safeguards, 70 and (3) predictive judgments regarding the powerful economic
7
and market incentives governing the operation of wholesale markets. ' The
FCC fully expected that the Omaha market would transition from a duopoly
market structure to a more competitive market structure encompassing
additional facilities-based and intramodal providers. However, its expectations
have not been fully realized.
First, the FCC is now considering a petition from McLeodUSA for
reconsideration of the Omaha ForbearanceOrder.72 Events transpiring since
the 2005 order suggest that the FCC's predicted trend of increasing
competition in Omaha has failed to materialize. For instance, McLeodUSA, the
only other significant local competitor in Omaha other than Cox when the
order was issued, has since cancelled plans to expand its role as a
telecommunications competitor in Omaha and, in fact, has retrenched its
Omaha operations. 73 Integra, another potential competitor, had considered
74
entering the Omaha market but after the Omaha order cancelled those plans.
Actual economic decisions by potential competitors have spoken louder than
FCC theoretical predictions regarding the likely emergence of local
competition.7 5
Second, the Commission predicted that local market entrants would continue
to rely on other wholesale access rights available through section 271 and
76
section 251(c) since these regulatory requirements remain in place. The
problem with this path is that the pricing standard associated with these options
is not conducive to entry. The UNE pricing standard was cost-based 78
wholesale access through sections 271 and 251(c) might not be cost-based.
Wholesale elements purchased from an ILEC using a non-cost-based pricing
standard is likely to place entrants at a severe disadvantage when pricing their
retail services to mass market consumers. 79 This is a form of exclusionary
behavior practiced by a monopoly provider of an input when it also operates in

70 Id.

57, 90.
Id. TT 64-72, 8 1-83.
72 In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in
the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, Petition for Modification of McLeodUSA
Telecommunications Services, Inc., WC Docket No. 04-223 (filed July 23, 2007). Details
about events that have transpired since the Omaha order are chronicled in the Phoenix
ForbearanceOrder.Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 34.
73 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, T 34.
'

74 Id.

7 Id. ("these subsequent developments have cast doubt on the accuracy of the
Commission's first prediction made in the Qwest Omaha ForbearanceOrder").
71 Id.

35.

n Local Competition Order,supra note 34, T 672-703.
78 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 35 n. 115.
79 See Triennial Review Remand Order,supra note 14, 11 46-48.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

334

[Vol. 20

output markets in retail competition with its wholesale customers.so
Third, the Omaha approach predicted that the market success with respect to
mass market customers of the incumbent cable operator in entering the local
telecommunications market would inspire additional facilities-based entry and
help to mitigate any concern that a duopoly market structure would persist.81
But the Commission failed to appreciate the significant advantages a cable
operator possessed compared to other potential entrants. 82 Incumbent cable
operators were positioned uniquely in local markets, for they already had in
place a facilities-based network that provided multi-channel video
programming to mass market customers. Because of technological
advancements, cable operators were able to upgrade, at a relatively low
marginal cost, their existing networks to provide local telecommunications
services and broadband services to mass market customers. Such an unusual
path of entry is not available to any other firm. Moreover, despite the low
marginal cost of upgrades, cable operators remain unmotivated to augment
their telecommunications networks to reach a majority of business/enterprise
customers within a geographic market and, thus, increase the level of retail
competition for the enterprise segment of the local market.84
V.

THE PHOENIX APPROACH

The Omaha analytical approach was not well received. This compelled the
FCC to develop a new approach for making forbearance decisions.86 In the
Phoenix Order, the FCC used a rigorous market power approach and granted
no relief from regulations.87 When the FCC looked back on the actual
development (or, more accurately, lack of development) of narrowband local
voice competition in the Omaha market, it concluded that its previous
so Id.

81Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 36.
82 See id. 36 (discussing the ability of cable operators to make incremental upgrades to
their networks).
83See id. 84 ("In short, cable operators may have faced comparatively lower barriers to
entering telecommunications services markets because they owned existing cable networks
that could be upgraded at a feasible incremental cost, but this does not imply that entry
barriers for other competitive LECs have eased.").
"See id. T 36.
85See, e.g., Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 294, 303-05 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing
the FCC's departure from precedent); in re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area,
Additional Comments ofPAETEC, Covad, TDS Metrocom and U.S. Telepacific, WC Docket
No. 09-135, at 4 (filed Apr. 29, 2010) (describing the Commission's analysis in the Omaha
ForbearanceOrder as "the failed Omaha experiment").
8 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, $T 23-37.
" Id. 2, 41-45.
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approach for analyzing forbearance petitions was flawed in several respects.
Table 1 provides background information comparing several metrics for the
cities involved in the case study comparison. Table 2 compares the Omaha
approach to the Phoenixapproach with respect to ten issues.
Table 1: Background Information on Omaha and
Phoenix Metropolitan Statistical Area
PHOENIX
OMAHA
Arizona 90
Nebraska and Iowa89
State(s)
1,445,632
408,952
Population (2010)
6th
42nd
City Market Ranking
Dominant
Qwest and Cox 92
Qwest and Cox91
Telecommunications
Carriers

Number of Wire Centers in
Qwest's Service Territory

6494

2493

Table 2: Comparison of Omaha Approach to
Phoenix Approach for Ten Issues
PHOENIX
OMAHA
ORDER
ORDER
ISSUE
1. Methodology to conduct forbearance
analysis

Depends on relief
sought95

Rigorous market
power analysis 96

2. Is duopoly sufficient for effective
competition?

Yes 97

No, not in most
cases

8

Id.

23-37.

89 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note

4, T 2 n.3.
1.

90 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5,

91See discussion, supra note 40.
92Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 42 n. 143.
93 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 2 n.3.
94 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 22 n.67.
13-14 & 14 n.46.
95 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4,
96 PhoenixForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 41.
The Commission rejected the notion that its decision in the Omaha Order would result
in a duopoly, despite that Qwest and Cox were the only major competitors in the Omaha

MSA, because it believed that its predictive judgments that competition would flourish
would be borne out. Omaha Forbearance Order, supra note 4,

71. Nonetheless, the

Commission appears to have recognized that the Qwest/Cox duopoly was the foundation for
later competition. Id.
98 PhoenixForbearanceOrder,supra note 5,

29-32.
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3. Likelihood that the ILEC, after
forbearance relief, would continue to
lease wholesale facilities at
competitive rates and terms to
competitors
4. Likelihood of emergence of
additional wireline facilities-based

competitors besides incumbent cable
operator
5. How important are regulatory
provisions (such as section 271
requirements and section 251 (c)(4 )
resale) besides mandatory UNE in

Key prediction 99

Optimistic

io.

[Vol. 20

Nol00

Little realistic

prospect 102

Very importantl 03

Unimportant1 04

No105

Nol06

facilitating local competition?

6. Are VOIP and wireline telephones
close substitutes?
7. Are mobile wireless services and
wireline services close substitutes?
8. Impact of mandatory UNE
obligations on ILEC investment
incentives for legacy network
9. Importance of the goal of regulatory
parity

o108

107

Detrimental' 09

Neutral

High'

Lowl2

99 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 179.
100 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 34.
101 Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4, 71.
102 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 36.
103 See Omaha Forbearance Order, supra note 4,

10

57, 92 (discussing the scope of

forbearance).
Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 35.
1os Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4, 72.
106 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5,
T 54.
1o7 Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 72.
108Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5,
55-61.
10

109 Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4, ff 76, 78 (discussing that forbearance from
section 251(c)(3) obligations will remove regulatory burdens and thus increase regulatory
parity).
ii Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5,

108.

1 Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4, NT 76, 78 ("we believe that it is in the public
interest to place intermodal competitors on an equal regulatory footing by ending unequal
regulation of services provided over different technological platforms").
112 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note

5, 1 107.

The Evolution of FCC Forbearance Orders

2012]1

10. Anticipated costs of regulatory
intervention

High"
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Low11 4

There are significant policy differences over eight of the ten issues. Perhaps
the most profound change in analytical approach implicates the question of
whether the presence of a single facilities-based competitor to the ILEC is
sufficient for the FCC to conclude that a market is effectively competitive and,
thus, merits UNE forbearance. The Omaha Forbearance Order accepted
duopoly as a sufficient condition to grant forbearance from UNE
obligations. 5 The Phoenix approach answers this question in the negative for
the overwhelmingly majority of cases, including for the Phoenix market.16 It
highlights theoretical and empirical concerns that a duopoly market structure
will result in low prices, high output, high quality, and innovation.
Predictive Judgments

A.

In the Omaha approach, the FCC made critical predictive judgments (issues
3, 4, and 5 in Table 2) that countered concerns about the continuation of a
duopoly market structure.117 The FCC expected entry of facilities-based and
intramodal suppliers to supplement the incumbent cable provider in the Omaha
market.
In particular, the FCC anticipated three paths for the new entry.
First, the FCC expected that the ILEC would voluntarily continue to make
wholesale elements available to competitors at competitive terms and
conditions." 9 The idea was that the ILEC, with its low marginal cost, high
fixed cost, cost structure when providing service, would want to encourage use
of its narrowband network even if it lost a retail voice customer to a rival.120
113 Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4,
76-77 ("we conclude that the costs of
unbundling obligations in parts of the Omaha MSA outweigh the benefits").
114 PhoenixForbearanceOrder, supra note 5, 109.
115In referring to the focus on the presence of a single facilities-based competitor under
the Omaha approach, the FCC concluded, "This focus inappropriately assumed that a
duopoly always constitutes effective competition and is necessarily sufficient to ensure just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates and practices, and to protect consumers." Id. 1 29.
116 Id.
29-32. The FCC argues that, at times, it has granted forbearance in the presence
of a duopoly market structure (e.g., the market for Internet broadband access) but only
where the likelihood of potential competition was high).
117See Table 2, supra Part V.
118Omaha ForbearanceOrder,supra note 4, 171.
"1
120

Id.

81.

See id. The failed prediction was supported by a body of research developed by
scholars in telecommunications. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications
Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 457 (1999) ("ILECs have a strong incentive to sell unbundled
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Qwest lent weight to that theory, arguing that to behave otherwise would be
economically irrational.121 In stark contrast, the FCC now argues that an ILEC
will instead exploit its monopoly position and its ability for vertical foreclosure
in wholesale markets.122 This new realization is supported by real-world events
in the Omaha market after unbundling relief was granted.123
One can use the Phoenix approach to envision positive circumstances
characterizing a local voice market in which the FCC could conclude that a
duopoly market is sufficient for effective competition and, thus, grant UNE
relief for the ILEC. For instance, a wireline duopoly is sufficient if any-or,
better yet, a combination-of the following economic factors were in place:
1. If the ILEC voluntarily provides wholesale loops and transport at
competitive prices and terms to retail voice rivals in the local market,
2. If the incumbent cable operator continued to expand its
telecommunications network to serve additional mass market and
business customers and this investment inspired new facilities-based
entry by others such as a wireline electricity provider,124
3. Wireless telecommunications service provided by independent wireless
providers with extensive wireless networks in a local market are
considered by mass market customers to be a good substitute for
wireline telecommunications service, or
4. Over-the-top Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") service, such as that
offered by Vonage, utilizing a broadband Internet connection, is
considered to be a good substitute for wireline telecommunications
*125
service.
B.

Public Interest Considerations

The Phoenix approach placed different subjective weight on other factors
considered in the forbearance analysis, such as those reflected in issues 8, 9,
and 10 in Table 2, that addressed public interest aspects of unbundling
policy.126 In the Omaha approach, there was a heavy focus on the costs to
society from continuing with a mandatory unbundling policy when some
elements to competitors at market-determined prices").
121Letter from Cronan O'Connell, Qwest, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, attach.
at 2-3 (July 25, 2005), availableat http://commcns.org/JJgovo.
122Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, 33.
123 Id. 34.
124 Factors I and 2 did not materialize as the Commission predicted in the Omaha Order.
See id. 33.
125More weight should be given to Factors 3 and 4 in future forbearance proceedings. See
54-61 (discussing a lack of evidence to establish that VolP providers or mobile
id.
wireless service providers could provide effective competition for wireline service).
126 See Table 2, supra Part V.
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facilities-based competition was observed in a local telecommunications
market.127 These costs included how an unbundling policy reduced the
incentive of the ILEC to invest in new facilities and to innovate, the costs of
managing shared resources, and the unfairness of one facilities-based
competitor (the ILEC) subject to regulatory obligations while another
facilities-based competitor (the incumbent cable operator) was free of such
obligations.128

In the Phoenix approach, more attention is paid to the widespread benefits to
society from an unbundling policy and the costs of such a policy are
downplayed or dismissed. For instance, it discusses the benefits of an
unbundling policy in promoting competition for services other than traditional
voice services.129 A competitor can use an unbundled local loop leased from
the ILEC to provide, in addition to voice services, broadband and video
services and, thus, enhance competition in these related markets.130 The FCC
argued that investment incentives would be unaffected by continuation of a
requirement to unbundle legacy facilities.13 1 These investments by the ILEC
are sunk costs, and future investments would be targeted to construct fiber
facilities which are, in general, free of regulatory obligations.132 In short, the
public interest benefits of an unbundling policy exceed the costs of such a
policy, at least until substantial (more than two competitors) facilities-based
competition in local telecommunications markets could take hold.
Regardless of the approach, a forbearance decision is a decision that
involves uncertainty. In hindsight, it appears that the FCC prematurely granted
relief from unbundling obligations in the Omaha Forbearance Order. At the
same time, it relied on predictive judgments that enabled the FCC to justify
removing regulations and rely on market forces to protect consumer welfare.
These turned out to be unsubstantiated. In the Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,the
FCC changed its approach to forbearance and created a new market power
standard (with no reliance on predictive judgments) that is more likely to err on
the side of denying relief from regulations when, in fact, relief may be
justified. To some extent, the Phoenix approach may be attributable to the new
Obama Administration and its widely publicized view of the need for more
stringent antitrust enforcement than existed in the previous Bush
Administration.133 The new approach is more likely to retain regulations when
127 Omaha ForbearanceOrder, supra note 4, % 75-83 (analyzing Qwest's forbearance
petition under section 10(a)(3)'s public interest standard).
12

See id.

76-78.

129 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, TT 102-103, 106.
130 Id.

106.

131 Id. T 108.
132

id.

133See Stephen Labaton, Administration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust Rules, N.Y.
TIMES,
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they are no longer needed than to relax regulations and bet on the invisible
forces of the market to protect consumer welfare. A significant aspect of the
Phoenix approach is a reduction in the likelihood of premature forbearance.
VI. REFINEMENTS TO THE PHOENIXAPPROACH
First, the Phoenix approach needs to include disinterested empirical studies
examining the economic relationships between wireline telecommunications
services and mobile wireless services. If an independent agency with economic
expertise such as the FCC conducted a rigorous statistical analyses, the
empirical results would be viewed with more credibility compared to the
standard practice today, where the FCC relies on interested and sponsored
parties. 34
There has been and continues to be rapid growth of mobile wireless voice
and data services.' 35 Is mobile wireless service a complement to or a substitute
for wireline services? It is reported that almost 25 percent (a percentage that
has doubled in three years) of all households in the United States rely
exclusively on wireless phones whereas about 60 percent (a percentage that has
stayed relatively constant over the last three years) subscribe to both a mobile
wireless and wireline service.136 Economically, it is imperative to know if
mobile wireless service acts as a constraint on the price of wireline service. If
the answer is yes, then the presence of a mobile wireless supplier should be
included in the market power analysis of a geographic market such as
Phoenix. 137
The Commission's approach should grapple with a confounding factor: what
if the wireline ILEC is also a mobile wireless supplier, like AT&T and
Verizon? In that case, the competitive influence of the wireless supplier in
constraining the price of wireline service should be discounted to some degree,
because the "competition" is merely different units within the same

11, 2009, http://commcns.org/KXWiOp.
See, e.g., Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, TT 71-72 (relying on evidence "in
the record" to make its competitive determination).
In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Mobile Wireless, including Commercial Mobile Services, Fifieenth Report, 26 F.C.C.R.
9664, 2 (2011).
1 Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5,
55 n. 164.
137 Furthermore, the data appears to show that an asymmetric substitution
effect is
occurring between wireline and wireless services. If there is a small but significant increase
in price of wireless service, it is unlikely that a significant number of consumers will switch
to wireline service (because of the value of mobility), but if there is a small but significant
increase in wireline phone service, it is likely that a significant number of consumers will
switch to wireless service.
Ma
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business.'3
It is now time to more fully include wireless service into the
market power analysis when examining forbearance from regulation of legacy
wireline service.
The Commission should also apply the Phoenix market power approach to
broadband/advanced services. 139 First, the Commission wishes to promote
investment in fiber facilities with higher broadband speeds and capabilities to
advance the goals identified in Section 706 of the Act, which may be advanced
using a market power approach. 140 Second, the FCC characterizes broadband
markets as rapidly evolving and subject to emerging competition.141 The
growth of nascent markets counsels against regulating them, especially when
the FCC has experienced difficulty finding appropriate authority to regulate
those markets.142 Third, the ILECs were often second entrants into provision of
broadband services following the entry of incumbent cable operators.143 There
is no history of market dominance that regulations could curtail. Nonetheless,
it seems appropriate to conduct first a rigorous market power analysis for
broadband services and then, second, to incorporate into the analysis Section
706 considerations. 144 In theory, the goals of Section 706 could override the
13 One way to calculate the market share of an ILEC that is both a wireline and wireless
provider to the same market is to use the sum of its wireline and wireless sales.
139The Commission did not do so in the Phoenix Order.See Phoenix Forbearance
Order,
supra note 5, 39.

140 See CONNECTING AMERICA: A NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN,
FCC, 9-11 (2009),

http://commcns.org/sCCj9m (outlining the FCC's goals for broadband in general terms).
Note, however, that an analysis under Section 706 criteria, which are vaguely defined, may
not be compatible with a market power approach, leading to inconsistent recommendations.
141In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory
Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer Ill
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services;
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer Il1 and ONA Safeguards and
Requirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance
Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or,
Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to
the Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of
Pro0 osed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, T 50 (Aug. 5, 2005).
2 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (vacating the FCC's
exercise of ancillary authority over Comcast with respect to its network management
practices).
143 As noted above, cable operators could more easily upgrade their facilities to provide
broadband service. See discussion, supra note 83.
This position is consistent with the argument advanced by Selwyn and Golding that
"although the FCC suggests a somewhat different approach may be called for in broadband
proceedings, the rationalizations that have been put forward for treating broadband
differently from other types of access should not be elevated over the compelling
competitive concerns expressed by the FCC in the [Phoenix ForbearanceOrder] ruling."
Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status ofBroadbandInternet
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market power analysis.
The Commission should tackle implementation difficulties when
administrating a decision to relax an ILEC's UNE obligation based on the
presence of effective competition for the legacy voice mass market service, but
where effective competition is lacking for other services such as broadband.
This issue appeared to be totally ignored by the FCC in the Omaha approach.
The Phoenix approach recognized the issue but it did not develop a concrete
plan for administration. 145
Relaxing an UNE obligation can affect multiple services.1 46 An ILEC
petitions for relief from, say, unbundling local loops in a specific wire center in
a metropolitan statistical area. The relief is based on the argument that
competition exists for the legacy voice service. However, a rigorous market
power analysis must examine competition for each service that can be
provisioned with the unbundled element.147 A conservative approach would
suggest that relief cannot be granted until effective competition is in place for
each service associated with the specific network element. However, this might
result in unacceptable delays.
This issue implicates a related issue involving the marketing of bundled
services to customers. Local telecommunications providers offer a variety of
choices for customers: local voice service, long distance voice service,
broadband Internet access, and multi-channel video programming services.148
Services are offered individually and in combinations with significant
discounts when purchasing a bundle of services versus purchasing the same set
of services individually.149 Competitors that lease an unbundled element such
as a local loop can use that element to provide a variety of services for a
customer similar to the ILEC. 50 The FCC should take into account in its
forbearance analysis that competitors may be able to offer a multiplicity of
services from a single unbundled element.

Access: A Policy Frameworkfor Net Neutrality and Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED.
COMM. L.J. 91, 135 (2010).

145Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, T 44.

102-103, 106.
147The Phoenix Order, although it acknowledged the potential effect of a forbearance
decision related only to legacy services on advanced services, did not conduct separate
39analyses for all the services that could be supported by unbundled facilities. See id.
40, 102, 106 (providing no separate market analysis for broadband services).
148See, e.g., Browse for Top Bundles, Cox, http://commcns.org/N3o4wW (last visited
May 13, 2012).
149 Id.
Iso Phoenix ForbearanceOrder,supra note 5, TI 102-103, 106.
'4 Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The FCC was right to change the approach it uses to evaluate forbearance
relief from legacy regulations for ILECs. The Omaha approach was too loose
The result of the Omaha
and lacked a rigorous analytical framework.
approach is the possibility of inconsistent decision making in the presence of a
similar set of facts. This apparently was the case when the FCC utilized a
variation on the approach it used in Omaha in 2005 when it evaluated
Verizon's petition for relief for six metropolitan statistical areas in 2007.152
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that the FCC not only departed from FCC forbearance precedent but
failed to explain the reasoning behind the departure. 5 3 Such a result was
possible given the lack of economic rigor in the FCC decision making process.
In response, the FCC now utilizes a more highly structured approach in its
forbearance analyses. The likelihood of inconsistent decision making is now
considerably reduced. While there is still room for improvement in the FCC's
application of a market power analysis to forbearance requests (such as
including the importance of wireline versus wireless substitution), the
analytical base that has been built is considerably stronger.

151For a similar appraisal, see Rob Frieden, Telecommunications Policy: Case Studies in
Abandoned Empiricism and the Lack of Peer Review at the Federal Communications
Commission, 8 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 277, 291-92 (2010).

152In re Petitions of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence and Virginia
Beach Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R.
21,293 (Dec. 4, 2007).
153 See Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 294, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Specifically, the
Court found that the FCC applied an unjustified per se market share test in the six
metropolitan areas when deciding whether to grant UNE relief. Id. at 302-03. The market
share test considered only actual competition while, in contrast, in previous forbearance
orders (such as Omaha where relief was partially granted) the FCC considered both actual
competition and potential competition in the marketplace. Id.

